English Companies\u27 Act,1929 - Cause and Effect by Parnaby, John F.
Journal of Accountancy 
Volume 50 Issue 6 Article 5 
12-1930 
English Companies' Act,1929 - Cause and Effect 
John F. Parnaby 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Parnaby, John F. (1930) "English Companies' Act,1929 - Cause and Effect," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 
50 : Iss. 6 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol50/iss6/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, 
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
English Companies’ Act, 1929 — Cause and 
Effect
By John F. Parnaby
November 1, 1929, is a date which will be remembered by all 
who are engaged in the accountancy profession in England.
The most important English statutes governing joint-stock 
companies had been, up to that time, the companies acts of 1908 
to 1917, but as time went on it became increasingly apparent that 
this legislation needed revision, and finally a committee was ap­
pointed to make an exhaustive examination of the position.
As a result of the recommendations made by this body came 
the companies act of 1928, the object of which was merely to 
amend the law as it stood.
With the solitary exception of one section, this act, although 
passed by parliament, never came into operation, but instead 
came an act consolidating such of the old law as was not intended 
to be repealed by the 1928 act, and including in their entirety 
every one of the new provisions embodied in that act.
The new statute is known officially as the companies act of 
1929, and in its character of a new broom sweeping completely 
away all previous legislation on the subject, it is worthy of a brief 
examination.
To attempt to treat any technical subject in narrative form is 
apt to call forth harsh criticism from more exacting students of 
that subject, so it may be well at the outset to emphasize that no 
endeavor will be made here to convey more than an indication of 
the more important changes resulting from the new enactment.
It is a curious fact that, prior to November 1, 1929, when the 
new statute took effect, there was apparently no legal obligation 
for a company to keep any books of account at all.
Certain it is that the old statutes presupposed accounts, as they 
provided for their audit and verification, but this is the first time 
that any definite requirement has appeared, and it is now im­
perative for every trading company to keep records of cash, sales 
and purchases of goods, and of assets and liabilities.
There had previously been no regulations controlling the length 
of time which might elapse before a new company exhibited its 
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first set of accounts to its members. As might be expected, this 
state of affairs led to much comment and complaint from unfortu­
nate shareholders who were kept unaware of the progress of their 
investments for an undue period, and, more important still, it 
paved the way for more than a few successful defalcations.
It is now required that a newly formed company must produce 
complete accounts within eighteen months of the date of its incor­
poration, and thereafter at least once in every calendar year, and 
that such accounts must be laid before a general meeting of the 
company held within nine months after the date to which the 
accounts are made up.
Many consider that these provisions are still too lenient, and 
that owners should be given some statement of their company’s 
progress at a much earlier date.
Time alone can show whether this contention is justified or not, 
but it is, perhaps, worth remarking that even under this new legis­
lation it is apparently possible for a company to prepare its ac­
counts on, say, January 31st, and then run right on until Decem­
ber 31st of the following year, thus having an unbroken period of 
practically two full years.
Another fruitful source of discontent amongst the investing 
public had been the growing tendency for published accounts to 
become increasingly condensed.
In many cases, even were the shareholder an expert accountant, 
the balance-sheet could have conveyed little to him, and this 
again, except that reference could be had to the auditor’s report 
thereon, made it possible for these statements to become very 
misleading. Moreover, often where members inquired, at a 
general meeting, into the composition of items appearing in the 
accounts submitted to them they would be met with evasive and 
unsatisfactory answers.
There was, of course, the obvious argument in support of these 
condensed statements. Trade rivals, it was said, might other­
wise be enabled to obtain helpful information; but disgruntled 
shareholders found little satisfaction in this explanation.
Those responsible for the drafting of the new act are to be con­
gratulated on the fact that, while full disclosure is now impera­
tive, few, if any, of the advantages of the old policy of secrecy 
have been foregone.
Assets, previously permitted to be grouped more or less at will, 
must now be distinguished as of either the fixed or floating class. 
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Each of the fixed assets must also indicate on what basis its value 
has been computed.
The act also specifies a somewhat extensive list of individual 
assets, each of which must appear as a distinct item on the bal­
ance-sheet of the company which is presented to the members. 
Goodwill and loans to directors may be mentioned as two typical 
examples of such assets.
But it must not be supposed that, merely on account of the 
absence of legal compulsion to the contrary, English companies, as 
a whole, had persisted in producing accounts without the desirable 
detail included.
This was not so. The vast majority was content to be guided 
by the auditors, who for the most part required accounts which 
were largely in accordance with the new legal requirements, but it 
must be borne in mind that the auditor of an English company is 
not in the same position to insist on the particular form of the 
accounts he is auditing, as is an auditor engaged in the United 
States by the directors of a corporation.
While on the subject of auditors, there are slight changes to be 
mentioned.
No person who was a director or any officer of a company could 
be the auditor of that company, under the old law, and the same 
restriction still holds good. It is extended, however, so that any 
person who is a partner or employee of an officer of the company 
is also now expressly excluded from eligibility to the auditorship.
The new statute confers upon the auditor an important right in 
that he is now entitled to attend any general meeting of the com­
pany at which any accounts which he has examined are laid 
before the members. And further, if at that meeting he wishes 
to make any statement with regard to the accounts he is legally 
permitted to do so.
It has already been said that loans to directors constitute one of 
those assets which must be separately featured on the balance-sheet.
This regulation, alone, is of no use. On occasion it has been 
found that, during the year, directors have borrowed huge sums 
of the company’s funds, but just before the end of the fiscal year, 
have repaid the whole amount. There would thus be no loans 
outstanding at the date of the accounts, and therefore nothing to 
arouse suspicion in the minds of the owners. Yet, a few days after 
the year-end, the borrowing might recommence, with the same 
window-dressing operation in view when the end of the next fiscal 
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year came round. To meet the case, therefore, not only the 
final balance owing, but also amounts borrowed and repaid during 
the period covered by the accounts is required to be disclosed.
On the auditor is laid the duty of ensuring that this information 
reaches the shareholders, and if he is unable to get the necessary 
detail shown on the accounts he must disclose the position 
through the medium of his report.
Before the operation of the 1929 act it was comparatively un­
usual to read any published accounts in which the remuneration 
of the directors was shown.
It had been felt for some time that on this subject also some 
detailed information was often desirable, and provisions are now 
in force requiring the total amount of remuneration received by 
the directors from the company itself and its subsidiaries to be 
shown on the accounts of every company.
Unfortunately, however, much of the advantage of this section 
seems to have been lost by reason of a proviso which follows, to 
the effect that the emoluments of managing directors and those 
directors who hold salaried positions may be excluded from the 
aggregate figure which has to be disclosed.
Yet, as if to make up for the shortcomings of this section, 
a power is granted to the members of a company. If the holders 
of one fourth of the total voting power of the members so demand 
in writing, the directors must present to them a statement showing 
the aggregate amount received by the directors for each of the 
three preceding years. No director is, in this case, permitted 
exemption from disclosure, and the complete statement, when 
prepared, must be certified as correct by the company’s auditors. 
The company, however, can resolve that the statement shall not 
be furnished.
A significant new provision, relating to the liability of auditors 
and directors, has been given a place in the new act.
It was formerly possible for a company to include in its articles 
or by-laws, a provision exempting the directors or auditors from 
any liability, even in the event of negligence or breach of duty.
However unbelievable it may appear, one occasionally met 
instances where this had been done, and in actual fact one of the 
most important company-law cases of recent years involved a 
company in whose articles such a provision appeared.
It was from this case that the obvious undesirability of such a 
state of affairs first became apparent, and it is now provided that 
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any attempt to limit the liability of directors or auditors in the 
event of negligence or breach of trust shall be absolutely of no 
legal effect.
A curious anomaly which previously existed has now been 
corrected by the new statute. Public companies were required 
under the 1908 act to file yearly with the registrar of companies a 
statement in the form of a balance-sheet, duly audited.
Of course, the intention was that the statement to be filed 
should be roughly an abridged version of the company’s latest 
balance-sheet, for each respective year.
In the wording of the old act, however, this intention was not 
specifically stated, nor was there provided any date to which the 
statement must be made up.
Indeed, it is on record that on more than one occasion com­
panies presented the same statement for filing year after year, 
and, theoretically, this seemed to be all that was literally required. 
But such statements were naturally not acceptable to the regis­
trar, and occasion has now occurred to remedy the fault. The 
statement to be filed must now be a written copy of the last 
audited balance-sheet, certified as a true copy, and containing also 
a copy of the auditor’s report thereon.
Prior to the passing of the 1929 act, a satisfactory definition of a 
subsidiary company had long been wanted.
For the first time in English company law such a definition has 
now been supplied, and inasmuch as there are many widely- 
differing interpretations put upon the term “subsidiary” it is of 
interest to quote the actual definition appearing in the act.
The relevant section is number 127 and it reads as follows:
“1. (Sec. 127.) Where the assets of a company consist in 
whole or in part of shares in another company, whether held 
directly or through a nominee, and whether that other company 
is a company within the meaning of this act or not, and—
“ (a) the amount of the shares so held is, at the time when the 
accounts of the holding company are made up, more than 50 
per cent. of the issued share capital of that other company, or 
such as to entitle the company to more than 50 per cent. of the 
voting power in that other company; or
“ (b) the company has power (not being power vested in it by 
virtue only of the provisions of a debenture trust deed, or by 
virtue of shares issued to it for the purpose in pursuance of 
those provisions), directly or indirectly, to appoint the majority 
of the directors of that other company,
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“that other company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary 
company within the meaning of this act, and the expression 
‘ subsidiary company ’ in this act means a company in the case 
of which the conditions of this section are satisfied.
“2. Where a company, the ordinary business of which includes 
the lending of money, holds shares in another company as security 
only, no account shall, for the purpose of determining under this 
section whether that other company is a subsidiary company, be 
taken of the shares so held.”
Having defined the subsidiary company, the act incorporates 
some welcome provisions to insure that members of any parent 
company shall be in a fair position to discern how the fortunes of 
the subsidiaries are faring.
Legally, prior to November 1, 1929, there was nothing to pre­
vent a parent concern from taking credit for all dividends re­
ceived from, or profits made by, those of its subsidiaries which 
were flourishing, and taking no cognizance of the fact that other 
subsidiaries were incurring losses.
The measures now in force to deal with this position require, 
first, that on the balance-sheet of the parent company there must 
appear a statement, signed by the same directors who sign that 
balance-sheet, showing in what manner the profits or losses of 
subsidiaries have been treated in the accounts of the parent 
company.
In particular, the statement must say how and to what extent 
provision has been made for the losses of any subsidiary, and to 
what extent, if at all, the losses of a subsidiary have affected the 
figure of profit or loss shown as the result of the parent company’s 
activities. It is, however, expressly stated in the act that there 
shall be no legal necessity to disclose the actual amount of the 
profit or loss shown by any subsidiary.
Second, it is expressly required that where the auditors of 
any subsidiary have found it necessary to make a report which 
contains any sort of qualification then to the next balance-sheet 
of the parent company there must be annexed particulars of that 
qualification.
It is generally agreed that the act should have gone on to define 
exactly what is to be understood by the term “qualification,” as 
without such a definition the operation of the above provision can 
hardly fail to give rise to dispute.
Perhaps the most welcome of all the changes brought about by 
the new legislation, at any rate from the point of view of the 
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prospective investor, are those affecting prospectuses and offers 
for sale to the public of shares or debentures in a company.
Even under the old law any prospectus issued inviting the gen­
eral public to subscribe for either shares or debentures was subject 
to severe rules which required full disclosure of all particulars of 
the company concerned, its directors, past record and so forth.
Had these rules functioned as they were intended to do, all 
would have been well; but they did not. It was not long before 
someone hit upon an ingenious idea to frustrate completely their 
application.
The method was simple in the extreme. The whole block of 
shares would be subscribed by an issuing house, the shares would 
be duly allotted, and from the company’s point of view the matter 
was finished.
Of course, the issuing house would proceed to sell the shares to 
the public, but the circulars, press advertisements and other meth­
ods of advertising which were commonly used to bring the shares 
to the notice of the man in the street were not within the statu­
tory definition of a prospectus, and thus not subject to any of 
the formulated rules.
The new provisions have effectively closed this loophole by 
extending the definition of a prospectus to include offers to the 
public of shares which have been allotted in this way.
Various additions and alterations have also been made to the 
rules themselves, but of these only three need be considered here.
When a company was making its first issue of shares, the 
prospectus had, under the old law, to name an amount which had 
to be received in subscriptions for the shares before the directors 
were permitted to make any allotments.
The idea of this minimum subscription was clearly to prevent 
the directors from proceeding to allot shares until the amount of 
capital taken up was at least sufficient to enable the company to 
start its activities properly.
This was another of the sections of the 1908 act for which a 
loophole was found, and it soon became a popular practice to name 
such a ridiculously low figure as the amount of the minimum sub­
scription that the advantage of the provision was entirely lost.
It is now provided that this minimum amount to appear in the 
prospectus must be the result of an actual estimate by the direc­
tors of the company. An estimate must be made of the pre­
liminary expenses of the company, of the cost of any property 
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which is to be acquired by the company, and of the amount 
required for working capital. The total of these three estimates, 
after deducting any amounts which are being provided otherwise 
than from the proceeds of this first issue, is the amount of the 
minimum subscription.
It has been the custom for many years to include in a prospectus 
some sort of a report of the past earnings of the company whose 
shares are concerned. But hitherto these reports were not sub­
ject to any legal restrictions and no standardization had been 
attempted respecting the form in which they were set out or the 
period with which they dealt.
An endeavor has been made in the new act to secure uni­
formity in this matter, and at the same time to insure that the 
information most vital to the prospective shareholder shall be 
disclosed.
In the prospectus the auditors of the company whose shares 
are being offered must report the profits of each of the three pre­
ceding years, and the report must state the rate of dividend paid 
for each of these three years with respect to each separate class 
of the company’s shares. If in any year no dividend was paid, 
this must be plainly stated.
Further, if the proceeds of the issue are to be applied either 
wholly or in part to the purchase of any business concern, an 
additional report must be included in the prospectus on the profits 
of that concern for each of the three preceding years.
It is noteworthy that, while this second report need not be 
made by the auditors of the company, the act specifically re­
quires that the names of the accountants who are responsible 
shall be shown in the prospectus.
The last of the prospectus regulations to be mentioned demon­
strates very clearly the attitude of the legal authorities toward 
the advertising of shares which come to the public for subscription.
It had become practically the usual procedure for a company 
of any magnitude to issue a prospectus of its shares, generally 
through the medium of a national newspaper, irrespective of 
whether or not it required any subscription from the general 
public.
In many cases the prospectus would invite public subscription 
in spite of the fact that the issuers of the prospectus had already 
previously arranged for the whole of the issue to be taken up by 
their friends. It would then happen that those members of the 
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public who applied for shares would get their money returned with 
a letter to the effect that so great had been the response to the 
issue that no allotment could be made. The result of a large 
number of letters of this nature invariably caused the shares to 
be much in demand, thus enabling the allottees to dispose of their 
holdings at a substantial profit!
No doubt, therefore, with the intention of preventing this 
method of rigging the market for newly issued shares, the act 
now requires every prospectus to state how many of the shares 
offered have already been taken up, or have been underwritten 
“firm.”
A section of the act which will do as much to prevent roguery 
as any other is that which relates to that ubiquitous person, 
the share-hawker. This gentleman would earn what was in 
many cases a thoroughly dishonest livelihood by the following 
means:
Having acquired odd lots of the most worthless shares money 
could buy, he would make a house-to-house canvassing trip. 
This, in itself, can be open to no objection, but it is to be feared 
that the houses to which most attention would be paid, would 
be those inhabited by rich and far-too-trusting persons who would 
fall easy victims to the plausible lies told by their visitors. Tales 
of new oil discoveries, rich seams in forgotten mines, a “certain 
merger” that was shortly to be made public, all were part of the 
hawker’s stock-in-trade, and would be used without hesitation to 
lure money from the pocket of the credulous listener in exchange 
for a few shares in a probably defunct company.
Naturally when the victim finally discovered the facts of the 
case, it would be far too late in the day to hope for retribution. 
However, things will now be changed, and the share-hawker will 
now be honest or out of work. The statute has started its anti­
hawking campaign with the provision that it is definitely illegal 
for any person “to go from house to house offering shares for 
subscription or purchase to the public, or any member of the 
public.”
In addition to this, written offers are also made unlawful unless 
emanating from certain specified sources, and unless accompanied 
by various detailed statements regarding the shares offered and 
the company concerned.
In relation to these provisions, an amusing suggestion has been 
made.
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Instances have already been given of the manner in which loop­
holes were found in former legislation and it seems that even 
this new act may not be quite watertight. The actual words of 
the statute, given above, prohibit the making of “house-to- 
house” offers of sale, yet the same section specifically states that 
the expression “house” shall not include an office used for business 
purposes. (This definition, incidentally, was necessary in view 
of the custom of members of the stock-broking community to 
approach each other with shares for subscription by means of 
inter-office visits.)
It has been suggested by a member of the legal profession that 
to go from house to office and office to house would not seem to 
be infringing the law, and it remains for someone with a spirit of 
bravado to put the matter to the test.
One of the most fundamental changes brought about by the 
new act is that machinery is now provided whereby shares may 
be issued at a discount. Formerly, while it was permissible to 
offer shares for subscription at a premium, it was theoretically 
impossible to attract subscription from the public by asking a 
price which was below the par value. I say theoretically 
with reason, as it was often quite possible to obtain virtually the 
same result as if the issue were actually made at a discount by 
taking advantage of the provisions permitting the payment of 
an underwriting or placing commission.
Incidentally there is good reason to believe that this somewhat 
indirect method will still continue to be used in spite of the new 
legislation, as the conditions to be complied with before any shares 
may be issued at less than par seem rather too strict to find pop­
ular favor. It is still not permissible to make an initial issue at a 
discount, and to be able to avail itself of the new provisions a 
company must have been entitled to trade for at least one year. 
Even then, not only must the members of the company au­
thorize the issue by resolution, but the sanction of the court is 
required.
Moreover, after the permission of the court has been obtained, 
the shares must then actually be issued within the period of one 
month, and on the face of it this restriction seems to leave rather 
an inadequate space of time in which to make the necessary 
preparations.
There are many who have remarked in the past upon the 
absence from English company law of any provisions permitting 
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the issue of redeemable shares of any class. It has even been 
said that there was no possibility of a company’s paying back its 
capital in any way other than in the form of dividends, or by 
going into liquidation.
While it is perfectly true that formerly it was not lawful to 
issue shares of a redeemable nature, the idea that capital could 
only be repaid by dividends or in the event of liquidation was 
totally erroneous. Provision was made, under section 40 of the 
old law, for accumulated profits to be paid to shareholders and 
treated as a reduction of the amounts paid up on their shares. 
It will be seen that this, if carried to its extreme point, at which 
the whole of the money paid on the shares would have been re­
turned, would give practically the same result as if the shares 
were actually redeemable. But there would be one vital differ­
ence in that the shares could never be canceled under this section, 
for the law insisted that the shareholders must remain liable to 
repay the full nominal amount, should occasion arise and a call 
ever be made.
This section of the act was seldom used, and it is generally 
believed that the reason it became a “dead letter” was the dis­
taste, inherent in the general public, for a share on which there 
was an uncalled liability.
In the new statute this old provision finds no place, and instead 
there appears a section permitting the issue of redeemable shares. 
This is not strictly the fundamental change that many would 
have us believe, but is merely an up-to-date version of section 
40 of the 1908 act, under a new name.
As yet the privilege of issuing shares on a redeemable basis is 
limited. Only preference shares may be so issued, and a company 
must first have express authority in its articles.
The actual redemption may be effected only in one of two possi­
ble ways. The first is out of profits which would otherwise be 
available for dividend, and the second, from the proceeds of a new 
issue of shares made for the purpose.
It is important to note that at the date of the redemption the 
shares to be redeemed must be fully paid up.
The act specifies the accounting entries to be made when the 
redemption is effected out of profits available for dividends, and 
requires an amount equal to the cost of redemption to be trans­
ferred from accumulated earnings and put to the credit of a 
separate account to be called the “capital redemption reserve
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fund.” This fund must then be considered as part of the com­
pany’s capital, and is, to all intents and purposes, fixed and un­
alterable, save for one important exception.
Should there be made to the shareholders a subsequent issue 
of bonus shares, it is permissible to use the amount standing to the 
credit of this capital redemption reserve fund in paying up the 
bonus shares so issued.
A further point worthy of note is that the inland-revenue de­
partment has made a concession in regard to these redeemable 
shares. When a new issue is made for the express purpose of 
redeeming a former issue it is provided that no stamp duty will 
be payable on the fresh issue except on the amount, if any, by 
which it exceeds the original issue.
In view of the recent announcement from the New York stock 
exchange demonstrating its disapproval of the way in which cer­
tain investment trusts have been in the habit of dealing in their 
own common stock, it is interesting to look for a moment at the 
attitude of the English statutes on this point.
Now, as always, it is absolutely illegal for any English company 
to become, either directly or indirectly, a shareholder of itself. 
But a possible method of evading even this unambiguous ruling 
had been found. There was previously nothing which prevented 
a company from lending its funds, and still less to prevent the 
borrower from buying the company’s shares with the loan!
To put an end to this sort of evasion, the 1929 act has found it 
necessary to inquire still further into the details of the loans made 
from the coffers of a company. And it is now specifically for­
bidden for any company to give financial assistance of any kind, 
whether by loan, guaranty, or otherwise, for the purpose of or in 
conjunction with the purchase of any of its own shares.
A few necessary exceptions are made, however, as in the case 
of a company whose business it is to lend money, and also when 
it is the policy of the company to assist its employees to become 
shareholders.
As a result of this section auditors may well find themselves 
in embarrassing situations, as there seems no doubt that to fulfil 
their duties strictly they will now be obliged to inquire not only 
as to the authority for every loan but also as to the precise 
reason for which it is required.
Everywhere, with the steady march of commercial progress, 
has come an increasing number of mergers, amalgamations and 
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combines, and England has been no exception to the rule. Small 
wonder, then, that the old legal machinery for dealing with such 
reorganizations had become lacking in both speed and con­
venience.
Among the most essential of the new provisions must therefore 
be numbered those which arrange for a more speedy and economi­
cal completion of the transfers involved in normal amalgamations.
It was not unusual in the past for much time to be wasted and 
much expense incurred on account of a mere handful of minority 
shareholders who objected on some ground to the particular 
scheme of which the majority was in favor.
While the courts have by no means ceased to protect the mi­
nority interests, there is now a rule which prevents any scheme’s 
being frustrated or delayed by any minority of less than 5 per 
cent. of the shareholders involved, unless, on appeal, the court 
is definitely of opinion that the whole arrangement is unfair and 
should be set aside. Moreover, this minority can now be com­
pelled to sell its shares on the same terms as have been accepted 
by the majority.
In addition to this, the court is given the power, when a scheme 
for reconstruction or amalgamation comes up for sanction, to 
make any order it thinks fit in the particular circumstances. It 
may order, for example, that the appropriate assets and liabilities 
shall be transferred from the absorbed to the absorbing com­
pany, or that the transferor company shall be deemed to be 
dissolved.
The immense advantage of such court orders can well be imag­
ined, as there ceases to be any need for the normal instruments of 
transfer, or the usual formality of liquidation proceedings, and the 
saving of both time and expense is therefore considerable.
There remains now one more section of the act to be considered. 
The foregoing alterations have related to the joint-stock company 
as a going concern, and it is fitting, therefore, to add in conclusion 
a few words on liquidation.
Under previous statutes there were, in general, two methods 
by which a company could go through this process.
There was the “compulsory” method which involved an appli­
cation to the court, and left the liquidator restricted in authority 
and obliged to obtain the court’s sanction of most of his actions; 
and there was the “voluntary” method, which left the wind­
ing-up of the company in the hands of a liquidator whose au­
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thority was derived from the creditors and the members of the 
company.
Actually there existed still another method which gave the 
court part powers of supervision over the liquidation proceedings, 
but with this process we are not concerned.
With the compulsory method there was no fault to be found, 
and it is virtually unchanged in the new legislation. But the 
objections to the old voluntary method were several. Mainly, 
they hinged on the question of the extent to which creditors of a 
company should be entitled to take part in or control the liquida­
tion proceedings.
Under the former law on this point the liquidator in a volun­
tary liquidation was obliged to call a meeting of creditors, as soon 
as he was appointed, and the extent to which he was controlled by 
those creditors was considerable. For example, the creditors 
could, if they wished, apply to the court for the removal of the 
liquidator appointed by the company and the appointment of 
someone else in his place; or they could appoint a committee to 
control his actions.
This was all very well when the company was insolvent and 
the creditors were therefore justified in wishing to assure them­
selves of getting as much of their dues as possible.
But it not infrequently happened that a company, without 
being insolvent, wished to wind up by voluntary method for 
some reason.
Even in such a case, although there might be not the slightest 
doubt that the creditors would all receive their money in full, the 
same regulations had to be observed and the creditors exercised 
the same extent of control. This was naturally felt to be rather 
unfair, and the amending provisions incorporated in the 1929 
act were therefore warmly received.
A voluntary liquidation is now divided into two sections: one 
for the case of the solvent company and the other for the in­
solvent.
To be entitled to come under the first head the directors of a 
company about to go into liquidation are obliged to make a 
declaration to the effect that, in their opinion, the company will be 
able to pay all its debts in full within one year from the commence­
ment of liquidation. Having done this, the liquidation may be 
carried out as an entirely domestic affair, and the creditors have 
no voice in the proceedings.
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Should no declaration be forthcoming, however, the company 
automatically falls within the second or insolvent class, and 
throughout the liquidation the liquidator is guided primarily by 
the creditors and only to a less extent by the members of the 
company.
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